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极 地 政 治 
Changing Geopolitical Realities in the Arctic Region: 
Possibilities and Challenges for Relations between Denmark and China 
Camilla T. N. Sørensen, Assistant Prof., Dept. of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. 
This article analyzes and discusses how Denmark seeks to manage the changing geopolitical realities in the 
Arctic region specifically focusing on how Denmark seeks to manage its relations with China in the Arctic region.   
The geopolitical focus on and significance of the Arctic region are growing. There are two main driving 
factors. Firstly, the Arctic region contains large untapped energy and natural resource reserves that especially 
states with fast growing economies and high dependencies on imported energy and natural resources are attracted 
by. Secondly, with the melting and receding ice, new sea lines linking Asia and Europe will become navigable in 
the coming decades. This increases the importance for states of being able to influence the „rules‟ for access to 
and transportation in the Arctic region as well as it intensifies the interests and stakes involved in the still 
unsolved territorial and maritime disputes in the Arctic region. On top of this, the ongoing developments in the 
Arctic region involve issues of climate change affecting all states. In response to the growing geo-strategic 
importance of the Arctic region, all the great powers are currently examining how to strengthen their economic, 
political and military presence and influence in the region. Seen in this context, Denmark is in many ways a 
minor player – a small state – but if the focus is on „the Kingdom of Denmark‟ (the kingdom consists of Denmark, 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands), then Denmark has a major role to play.   
How to manage the changing geopolitical realities in the Arctic region is an increasingly challenging 
question for Denmark also because this question relates directly to the future of the „the Kingdom of Denmark‟ 
and thus the future relations between Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Here especially Greenland is 
changing its bargain power in relation to Copenhagen in these years as a consequence of Greenland‟s 
increasingly important geo-strategic location and its expected rich natural resources. In order to further explore 
and extract the natural resources on Greenland there is however a huge need for foreign investments. China has 
the money to invest and also has a huge and still growing need for natural resources.  
The debate in Denmark – and Greenland – on future developments in the Arctic region therefore tends to 
focus on China and the Chinese strategy and interests in the Arctic region. On the one hand, there is a strong 
interest in attracting Chinese investments to develop Greenland, but on the other hand there is a fear of Chinese 
investors, firms and workers coming to „take over‟ as Greenland opens more up for exploration and  extraction. 
On top of this, there is in Copenhagen an acknowledgement of the potential benefits for Denmark – for relations 
between Denmark and China on many other issues – in supporting a Chinese role in the Arctic region, e.g. in the 
Arctic Council, and in strongly engaging China on Arctic issues.  
Relations today between Denmark and China are good with cooperation strengthening on many issues and 
frequent high-level visits and dialogues. In April 2014 the Danish Queen had a very successful state visit to 
China with the signing of many important political and cultural agreements and a large business delegation was 
with her. The queen was met by President Xi Jinping, who during their meeting proclaimed that China in the near 
future will send two pandas to Copenhagen ZOO as a proof of the strong relationship – friendship – between 
Denmark and China Copenhagen‟s strong support for granting China observer status in the Arctic Council has 




2014 年 第 2 期（总 7 期） 
3 
 
学术委员会主任  夏立平                                    
学术委员会（按姓氏笔画为序） 
王传兴  陇丹红  陇玉刚  苏  平  陆俊元  宋黎磊   
杨  剑  张  侠  郭培清  夏立平  徐世杰  潘  敏 
  
主编  王传兴 









status in the Arctic Council in 2013 together with five other states including India and South Korea.  
However, as China becomes more active in the Arctic region relations between Denmark and China also 
risks being more challenged by the Arctic issue. This especially if China becomes more involved in the economic 
development on Greenland. It might also become more challenging for Denmark to manage its relations with 
China in the Arctic region if great power relations – great power competition –start to influence developments in 
and around the Arctic region more. NATO and the US continue to be the strongest strategic partners– the main 
strategic framework – for Denmark, and here it might become more difficult for Denmark to isolate its relations 
with China in the Arctic region from Denmark‟s relations with the EU, NATO and the US. Following the crisis in 
Ukraine there are growing tensions in relations between Russia on the one side and the EU, NATO and the US on 
the other side. Depending on how these relations further develop in the next months, new conditions for 
Denmark‟s relations with China in the Arctic region might develop.  
 
What is „the Kingdom of Denmark‟? 
„The Kingdom of Denmark‟ consists of Denmark and its two overseas regions Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands. The most northern part of „the Kingdom of Denmark‟ is Greenland, which is also the only Arctic territory 
in „the Kingdom of Denmark‟.  
Greenland has an area of over two million km2 making it the biggest island in the world, and Greenland 
makes up around 98 percent of the total area of „the Kingdom of Denmark‟. The population on Greenland 
however is only around 58.000, which is only around one percent of the Danish population of 5.5 million on an 
area of Denmark of just around 43.000 km2. The Faroe Islands are very small – in total around 1.400 km2 with a 
population around 50.000. Consequently, it is due to Greenland with its increasingly important geostrategic 
location and its expected rich natural resources that Denmark has a major role to play in the Arctic region. As 
Copenhagen is increasingly realizing in these years it is however not an easy role to fulfill and manage, and this 
also because Greenland in these years is seeking a more independent role and a stronger voice.  
 
How are relations in „the Kingdom of Denmark‟ organized and changing? 
The relationship between the three territories is one of a unitary nature – one common constitution, one 
common queen, one common prime minister and one common parliament in Copenhagen. Signif icant powers 
over internal affairs are however devolved to Green land and the Faroe Islands, who both have their own 
parliaments and governments as well but are also represented in the common parliament in Copenhagen. It is thus 
one kingdom but with two self-governing areas. Greenland and the Faroe Islands are both referred to as 
„self-governing territories‟.  
More specifically, Greenland and the Faroe Islands have what is referred to as „home rule‟, which means 
that they have power over all internal matters while Copenhagen maintains responsibility over external matters  
such as defense and foreign affairs. However, Greenland and the Faroe Islands can conclude international 
agreements if they concern only their own part/territory of the kingdom. An example is that Denmark is part of 
the EU, while both Greenland and the Faroe Islands have opted to remain outside of the EU. 
Relations between Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are continuously adjusted and re-negotiated, 
and especially Greenland has gained greater autonomy in recent years. The Greenlanders are now also 
established as a separate national people under international law with their own language. Furthermore, the 
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take over more administrative areas from Copenhagen and one day choose full independence.  
Greenland has in recent years also become less economically dependent on Copenhagen. Still Copenhagen 
annually transfers a block grant of approximately 650 million USD to Greenland, but it is agreed that when 
Greenland starts gaining more economically from its natural resources, the block grant will gradually be reduced. 
After the first approximately 14 million USD, which will go directly to Greenland, Denmark and Greenland will 
have to share the earnings from natural resources until they cover the block grant and then all future earnings will 
go to Greenland. Consequently, a main enabling condition for greater autonomy to Greenland is the further 
exploration and extraction of natural resources on Greenland. Today most Greenlanders rely on fishing and 
hunting for a living.  
In many ways Greenland is in a state-building and economy-building process in these years and its 
increasingly important geo-strategic location and its expected rich natural resources – which, however, are very 
demanding and costly to start developing and therefore need outside help and investments –makes this process 
very unprecedented and complex. 
There are more conflicts developing in relations between Denmark and Greenland in these years – who to 
govern and take decisions on which issues? Such conflicts especially develop because there are many new issues 
coming up in these years, where the geopolitical focus on and significance of the Arctic region are growing and 
more outsiders – states, big international companies and investment actors etc. – are getting interested and 
involved in developments in the region and on Greenland. Especially the question of who decided on the natural 
resource reserves on Greenland has proven controversial in relations between Denmark and Greenland. 
Exploration and extraction of natural resources on Greenland will involve foreign firms and states, why it might 
become related to issues of foreign policy.  
 
How has Denmark so far tried to deal with the changing geopolitical realities in the Arctic region? 
Denmark has been a little late in realizing the growing geopolitical and potential geo-economic importance 
of the Arctic region, but Copenhagen has in recent years increased the focus and has tried to take a more 
proactive approach. Denmark has especially tried to increase the role and influence of the Arctic Council and 
tried itself to play an active role in the council. Emphasis is on multilateral cooperation as well as on international 
law – „the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea‟ (UNCLOS) especially. This focus on multilateral 
cooperation as well as on international law is typical for Danish foreign policy. Also there is close coordination 
from Copenhagen with the US, which is also typical for the Danish foreign policy in these years. The Danish 
Foreign Minister Lidegaard in early May 2014 visited the US and in the meeting with the US Foreign Minister 
Kerry coordination on the two states‟ policies in the Arctic region was an important issue. It is thus important to 
emphasize that Denmark is unlikely to do anything in the Arctic region that is not in line with American and 
NATO policies and interests. 
More specifically, a joint policy document between Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Is lands “the 
Kingdom of Denmark‟s Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020”, was adopted in 2011. The focus in the strategy is 
twofold. Firstly, how to react to the signif icant environmental and geopolitical changes in the Arctic and the 
growing global interest in the region? And secondly how to define a new position for „the Kingdom of Denmark‟ 
and strengthen the Danish status as a player in the Arctic region? The goal of the strategy is a peaceful, secure 
and safe Arctic region with self-sustaining growth and development, and with respect for the Arctic‟s fragile 




2014 年 第 2 期（总 7 期） 
5 
 
学术委员会主任  夏立平                                    
学术委员会（按姓氏笔画为序） 
王传兴  陇丹红  陇玉刚  苏  平  陆俊元  宋黎磊   
杨  剑  张  侠  郭培清  夏立平  徐世杰  潘  敏 
  
主编  王传兴 









socioeconomic development of the areas in the Arctic region, e.g. Greenland. Also the s trategy aims to work 
against militarization of the Arctic region. 
Regarding more concrete issues and suggestions, the strategy highlights strengthening efforts to resolve 
territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law  and through negotiation and enhancing 
maritime safety through cooperation, clear rules and standards of navigation. Also there are suggestions for joint 
search and rescue operations as well as joint research. Regarding the still unsolved territorial and maritime 
disputes in the Arctic region, the signatories to „the Ilulissat Agreement‟ including all f ive coastal states of the 
Arctic Ocean – „the Kingdom of Denmark‟, Norway, Canada, Russia and the US – have assured each other that 
these disputes will be settled according to international law and by negotiation and if necessary according to „the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea‟ (UNCLOS). The US has not ratified UNCLOS, but by 
agreeing to „the Ilulissat Declaration‟ in 2008,the US has agreed to its relevance and use in the Arctic region. 
The Danish strategy also mentions NATO as an element in securing sovereignty and national security, but 
that only in case the focus on multilateralism and international law is not possible to follow. This Danish „just in 
case‟ emphasis on NATO underlines the strong weight that Denmark puts on its relationship with NATO and on 
the strategic partnership with the US.As indicated above, the crisis on Ukraine and the growing tensions between 
Russia on the one side and the US and NATO on the other side therefore might also strongly influence the room 
of maneuver for Denmark in the Arctic region. In order to implement its Arctic strategy, Copenhagen needs a 
good relationship with Russia and there are therefore growing Danish concerns that the tensions between Russia 
on the one side and the US and NATO on the other side could negatively influence established cooperation with 
Russia and generally the established multilateral cooperation and institutional set-up in the Arctic region that 
Denmark highly values.  
The Danish strategy furthermore has a strong focus on how to develop Greenland economically – to develop 
new economic activities and industries in Greenland but doing it in a sustainable way applying the highest 
environmental standards. A key point in order to develop Greenland economically of course is attracting 
know-how and investments, which as mentioned above has put the focus on China.  
A main overall concern in Copenhagen that is also reflected in the strategy is how to deal with issues related 
to the Arctic region on the one hand and to the future development of „the Kingdom of Denmark‟, especially the 
future relationship between Denmark and Greenland, on the other hand. On some issues Copenhagen is simply 
afraid to overrule Greenland – to act as a colony master – but there are strong interests involved from 
Copenhagen, not least in relations with China, and Greenland still lacks capabilities to deal with the many and 
complex issues. Also Greenland‟s international status – not a sovereign state – makes it difficult on some issues 
to „do it alone‟.  
 
How has Denmark so far sought to manage its relations with China in the Arctic region? 
As mentioned above Denmark has this rather ambivalent view on China in the Arctic region.  There are 
strong Danish, especially Greenlandic, interests in attracting Chinese investments, but there is also a fear of 
Chinese investors, firms and workers coming to „take over‟ as Greenland opens more up for exploration and 
extraction. On top of this, Copenhagen acknowledges the potential benefits for Denmark – and Danish relations 
with China in general – in supporting a Chinese role in the Arctic region and in strongly engaging China on 
Arctic issues. The Danish overall pos ition is also in favour of inclusiveness involving the partic ipation of 
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and views involved both in Copenhagen and in Copenhagen compared to on Greenland. As also mentioned above,  
Copenhagen maintains responsibility on foreign, security and defense policies, so Greenland has to go through 
Copenhagen for some issues related to China, while on others it can deal directly with Chinese counterparts, but 
sometimes the Chinese counterparts due to issues of sovereignty do not want to deal directly with Greenland but 
insist on going through Copenhagen.  
 
Implications for relations between Denmark and China – possibilities and challenges? 
Regarding possibilities, the Arctic region opens a potential field of cooperation between Denmark and China 
as it has also done so far. Especially in developing joint research on Arctic issues, e.g. climate change,  there are 
opportunities and there is already Sino-Danish cooperation established in this area. Also there are common 
interests in developing Sino-Danish cooperation on maritime transport, where both Denmark and China are 
maritime nations and thus depend on safe sea lines of transportation for economic growth and so on.  Also there is 
potential in a joint Sino-Danish focus on strengthening multilateral structures in the Arctic region.  As a way to 
deal with – and try to influence – Chinese interests and activities in the Arctic region, Denmark has strongly 
supported granting China observer status in the Arctic Council, and continued strong Danish engagement of and 
cooperation with China on Arctic issues could also „spill-over‟ on other fields of Sino-Danish relations. However 
– and here come the challenges – as China gets more active in the Arctic region and great power relations gets to 
„set the stage‟ more in the Arctic region, it might as discussed above become a bigger challenge for Denmark to 
deal with China in the Arctic region. Also if China – as Greenland hopes – gets more active and more involved in 
developing Greenland economically, this might result in new challenges for Denmark both in its relations with 
Greenland and with China. There are legal issues, e.g. if extract uranium on Greenland, which China might be 
interested in and which Greenland‟s economy might benefit a lot from, then it could be an issue of national 
security, which falls under Copenhagen, where there might be other more strategic interests, concerns and 
pressures, e.g. from the US, not to develop uranium. Same tension – and thus limits on Greenland‟s right to full 
management of their natural resources – is developing in relation to rare earth, where Greenland is also expected 
to have a big potential. Another angle here is that even though the „Great Scale Law‟ adopted in Greenland in 
January 2013 opens the way for establishing big mines in Greenland and for hiring foreign workers on 
Greenlandic minimum wages, then immigration law is still decided on in Copenhagen, where again other issues 
and concerns will play in.  
There is no doubt that the Arctic region will only get more important as well as more challenging for 
Copenhagen to deal with both in the future development of „the Kingdom of Denmark‟ and in Denmark‟s foreign 
policy, especially in Denmark‟s relations with China. In many ways Denmark – and Greenland – is in a learning 
process these years. The major international focus on the Arctic region and on Greenland is new for both 
Denmark and Greenland and how to deal with it and how to best ensure Danish, including Greenlandic, interests 
that is a growing and increasingly complex question in Copenhagen these years.  
 
Camilla T. N. Sørensen is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. She is  
currently (2012-2014) in Beijing affiliated as a visiting research fellow at the School of International Studies, Peking University, 
conducting a 1½ year research project granted by the Danish Research Council on the debate among Chinese International Relations 
scholars on Chinese foreign and security policy. Research focus is international relations, East Asian security and Chinese foreign 
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Relations (JCIR) and China Brief. Most recent publications are “Is China becoming more Aggressive? A Neo-classical Realist 
Analysis”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2013, pp. 363-385, and “Security Multilateralism in Northeast Asia: A Lost Game or 
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着浓厚的兴趣。在缔结《北极搜救协议》(Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search 









量才是发展北方航道的主要推动力。下图9是关于 2011 和 2012 年通航北方航道船舶的基本概况： 
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约》 (International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Vessels (MARPOL))、《国际
海上人命安全公约》(International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS))、《控制船舶
有害防污底系统国际公约》 (International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling 
Systems on Ships (Anti-fouling Convention)) 、《国际船舶压载水及其沉积物控制和管理公约》 
(International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments), 
《国际油污防备、反应与合作公约》(International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation (OPRC))。这些全球性的公约均适用于北冰洋。 然而，《联合国海洋公约》
第 234 条对于冰封水域 (Ice-covered areas) 的沿岸国管辖权的扩张作了例外性规定。 自 1991 年始，
国际海事组织一直在讨论制定航行极地水域船舶的强制性规定 (Polar Shipping Code)。11 然而迄今为止，
国际海事组织仅仅通过了没有法律拘束力的航行极地水域船舶的导则（2002 Guidelines for Ships 
Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters, 2009 Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters）。 
尽管迄今只是一个松散的政府间论坛，北极理事会在北极航运治理中扮演着重要的角色。2009 年由
保护北极海洋环境工作组 (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group) 发
布的《北极航运报告》 (Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment)，为国际北极航运法律和政策的制定提供
了坚实的科学基础。《北极航运报告》提出了 3 大类 17 条对于各利益相关方得具体建议。12 自 2009 年以
来，PAME 一直在从事着推动有关各方执行具体建议的后续工作。 2011 年格陵兰 Nuuk 举行的第 7 次部长
级会议上，北极理事会首次通过了具有法律约束力的《北极空海搜救合作协议》 (Agreement on 
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次部长级会议上，北极理事会再次通过了《北极海洋油污应急计划合作协议》(Agreement on Cooperation 
on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic)。这两个具有法律约束力的国际
协议对于北极航运法律体系的完善有着重要的意义。PAME 正在进行的有关北极航运的工作还包括：1）北
极理事会与其他国际组织的合作； 2）各种相关国际法律法规的统一、协调； 3）北极特别敏感海域的划











(heavy grade oil)。这一提议也遭到俄罗斯的强烈反对。 
即使极地航行的强制性规则于 2014 年出台并最快于 2016 年生效。其仍然要面对以下问题：1）Polar 
Shipping Code 将在多大程度上弥补现行极地航运法律体系的缺陷，如何设定极地航行船舶的建造、设计、
装备和人员标准，如何预防船舶压载水带来的外来物种入侵问题等等；2）如何协调与《联合国海洋公约》
第 234 条所谓“冰封条款”的关系。14 
迄今为止，国际上对于《联合国海洋法公约》第 234 条的解释尚未达成共识。对于什么是“冰封水域”
(ice-covered areas) 并无一致意见。然而，俄罗斯将第 234 条视为制定其国内法管理北方航道的国际法
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(Inter-agency Arctic Research Policy committee，IARPC)，直接向总统和国会负责。参与 IARPC 部门
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主席兼任 IARPC 办公室主任，并且是 USARC 的当然成员之一。通过主持 IARPC，把握美国北极政策的方向，
















项，以及两年来 IARPC 的成果。 
北极研究委员会（USARC），其主要职责是向总统和国会就北极科学研究方面的事务提出意见和建议。
由总统直接任命的 8 个委员组成，4 个来自高校或研究所的北极研究人员，2 个来自从事北极商业活动的
私人企业，1 个来自原住民，1 个来自科学基金会。包括：（1）给美国国家北极政策提出建议；（2）协助
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商务部，与极地政策是其下属单位——国家海洋和大气管理局（National Ocean and Atmospheric 
Administration, NOAA），主要关注地球的大气和海洋变化，提供对灾害天气的预警，提供海图和空图，
管理对海洋和沿海资源的利用和保护，研究如何改善对环境的了解和保护。2011 年 2 月，国家大气与海










是美国海军未来在北极地区的部署及行动方面。美国海军海洋学家少将 David Titley 在美国北极政策制
定中具有相当的影响力，他统领美国海军气候变化任务工作组（Task Force Climate Change）。2009 年
11 月，海军气候变化任务工作组发布了《海军北极路线图》（Navy Arctic Roadmap）。《海军北极路线图》
所关注的主要领域包括美国北极政策的导向、北极变化的环境、北极资源开发的现实与潜能、北极航运的
发展趋势、其它国家在北极的利益及活动、美国海军在北极地区的活动及经验、当前美国舰只在北极部署
的能力及限制等。另外，还规定了美国海军在 2010-2014 年的年度计划，并决定在 2014 年之前提交 4 年





事务局中专门设有海洋与极地事务办公室（Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs），专门负责美国与海洋、
北极、南极相关的国际政策的制定和执行。该办公室的 Julie Gourley 是代表美国参加北极理事会的各种











达 900 亿桶，北极圈内为完全探明储量、用现有技术可获取的天然气储量约有 47 万亿立方米，并且其中
的 84%分布在近海区域。这些报告对美国北极政策的制定提供了一些依据。 
交通部，交通部下属的美国海事管理局（Maritime Administration）负责北极地区的海上交通运输。
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各国的合作。2008 年 4 月时任美国海洋海事管理局局长的 Sean Connaughton 在参加由西雅图的螺旋浆俱
乐部主办的关于北极航运的会议时就表示，由于环境变化给北极地区的航运带来了更大的可行性与商业机
会，同时也强调了北极航运所面临的一系列不确定性，并且表示美国政府将帮助企业界应对挑战，加强基







关注。 今后壳牌将获准在阿拉斯加州海岸及外北极水域进行油气勘探作业。   
 
                                                 
1 目前为 Raytheon 极地服务公司：Raytheon Polar Services Company，RPSC，http://rpsc.raytheon.com/ 
2 http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/arctic/iarpc/iarpc_mtgs_public.jsp#staff（每月一次例会） 
2014 年 第 2 期（总 7 期） 
16 
 
学术委员会主任  夏立平                                    
学术委员会（按姓氏笔画为序） 
王传兴  陇丹红  陇玉刚  苏  平  陆俊元  宋黎磊   
杨  剑  张  侠  郭培清  夏立平  徐世杰  潘  敏 
  
主编  王传兴 









































2014 年 第 2 期（总 7 期） 
17 
 
学术委员会主任  夏立平                                    
学术委员会（按姓氏笔画为序） 
王传兴  陇丹红  陇玉刚  苏  平  陆俊元  宋黎磊   
杨  剑  张  侠  郭培清  夏立平  徐世杰  潘  敏 
  
主编  王传兴 











2014 年 2 月 
章节                                                 页码 
概要                                                   17 
引言                                                   19 
1. 研究目的                                            20 
2. 政策指导以及美国在北极地区的国家利益                21 
3. 变化中的北极地区安全环境                            21 
4. 美国海军在北极地区的战略目标                        25 
5. 美国海军在北极地区的领导地位和使命                  27 
6. 美国海军在短期、中期和长期行动的方式和手段          27 
7. 路线图的执行                                        28 
8. 结论                                                28 
附件 1: 用于报告北极海冰和海水港预测的主要文献          29 
附件 2：2009 路线图的完整行动                           30 
附件 3：北极路线图的实施计划                            31 
附件 4：缩略词汇表                                      48 

















2013 年 5 月，总统奥巴马发布了北极地区的国家安全战略，确定了作为一个稳定、和平的北极地区
的国家最终利益，国家本着信任和合作的方式履行责任，经济和能源资源以可持续利用的方式进行开发。
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此次更新的北极路线图建立在这些文件之上。海军对北极地区的路线图来源于 2013 年 5 月的北极地区国
家战略、其实施计划（2014 年 1 月）还有 2013年 11 月的国防部北极战略。路线图进一步受下述文件的
指导，2012 年 1 月防御战略指导：维持美国的全球领导地位：21 世纪国防优先；2010年 7 月的行政命令
13547：海洋的管理工作，我们的海岸线，还有五大湖（国家海洋政策）；2010 年 5 月国家安全战略；2010
年 2 月《四年防务评估报告》；2009年 1 月的国家安全总统指令-66/国土安全总统指令-25：北极地区政
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北冰洋海冰的消减将会继续，主要的水道将变得更加开放。到 2020 年，白令海峡预计每年有 160 天
的无冰期，17在平季18是 35-45 天。北方航线（参见图 5）将有多达 30 天的开放时间，在平季条件下能有
45 天。分析表明了其他航线的适航可能性，包括穿越北极的路线和西北航道，在这个时间内适航可能性
有限。基于冰期、融化和运动，平季航线将发生变化。 
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中期：2020 至 2030 
这段时期将看到北冰洋冰层的加速融化和更加开放的北冰洋海域。到 2025 年，白令海峡的无冰期将
达到 175 天（平季是 50-60 天）。这个数字将在 2030 年上升为无冰期 190 天（相当于平季的 70 天）。对于
北方海航线，预计有相当于 45 天的无冰期（平季是 50-60 天），到 2030 年能增长到 50-60 天的无冰期（平








查局估计未发现的常规油气资源约有 900 亿桶石油，1669 万亿英尺立方天然气，440 亿桶液态天然气。19这
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2008 年 5 月，北冰洋的濒临国家（美国、加拿大、格陵兰、挪威和俄罗斯联邦）签署了《伊卢利萨
特声明》，该协定指出公约是在北极地区国际合作和和平解决海洋争端的适用法律框架。282011 年 5 月，
北极理事会签署了《北极搜救协定》。292013 年 5 月，北极理事会国家签署了一份《北极海洋油污防范及
应变合作协议》，30声明了在北极地区通过合作来改善安全和环境。此外，日益增多的国家和其他组织都请
求北极理事会的观察员身份，显示了该地区日益增长的国际利益和北极理事会的重要性。 
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7. 路线图的执行    
附件 2 标示了 2009 年路线图完成的行动。附件 3 提供了对 2014-2030 路线图执行的改进行动。行动
的目录根据原则、组织、培训、物资、领导、教育、人员和设施（DOTMLPF-P）分配到海军办公室来处理
完成的未定期限。对给予支持的组织进行了列举，但不仅限与这些。最后，还将开发出跟踪指标和定期报
告来提供给海军作战部长（CNO）。   
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○ 2009 年，海军在北极圈北部部署了“斯坦尼斯号”航空母舰 
○ 2010 年，海军在北极圈北部部署了“波特号”驱逐舰来支持 2010 加拿大的演习 
○ 2011 年，海军在新罕布什尔州和康涅狄格州的冰站组织了科学演习（SCICEX） 
○ 2012 年，“伊利湖号”巡洋舰和驱逐舰“迪凯特”在北极圈北部行动 
○ 2012 年，美国海军驱逐舰“法拉格”在巴伦支海行动支持北极鹰行动，这是一个俄罗斯、美国和挪威的联合演习  
○ 2012 年，美国水下作战中心和美国宇航局进行了无人水下航行器行动来假想格陵兰岛东海岸的冰山 
○ 在奇数年，海军参加阿拉斯加湾北部边缘的联合演习 
 2010 年在海军武器中心的全球航运游戏 
 2011 年在海军武器中心的舰队北极行动游戏 
 北极基本能力评估（CBA） 
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OPNAV N3/ N5 Director TFCC 
TFCC（气候变化工作组） 
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OPNAV N3/ N5 DUSN PPOI（负责计划，
政策，监督和整合的海军
副部长） 
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2.4安全航行 
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2.6设施和设备 





OPNAV N4 Director TFCC 
TFCC 



















OPNAV N4 OPNAV N3/ N5 
USFFC N3/ N5 
CNIC 
NIPO 
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OPNAV N4 OPNAV N2/ N6 











OPNAV N4 OPNAV N3/ N5 
MSC 
USCG 
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OPNAV N9 Director TFCC 
TFCC 





OPNAV N9 OPNAV N8 
NAVSEA 
SYSCOMs（系统命令） 
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2.8海上感知能力 
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3.1.4：与主要的北极国家
确认和编纂协议 
OPNAV N3/ N5 DUSN  
PPOI 
 2014-2020 财年 
 
4.0执行 
行动 领导部门 辅助部门 DOTMLPF 暂停/中止 
4.1：向海军作战部长提供路
线图执行的半年度报告 
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CS-21R 21 世纪合作战略制海权（修订） 
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<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/33188/Arctic-Ocean>  来自中央情报局的世界概况。  
3 “北极地区”被定义为北极圈北部包括所有美国和外国领土的区域，所有美国土地边界的北部和西部都由波丘派恩河、育






2014 年 第 2 期（总 7 期） 
51 
 
学术委员会主任  夏立平                                    
学术委员会（按姓氏笔画为序） 
王传兴  陇丹红  陇玉刚  苏  平  陆俊元  宋黎磊   
杨  剑  张  侠  郭培清  夏立平  徐世杰  潘  敏 
  
主编  王传兴 










4 国防部的“功能”一词定义是：“适当的分配职责、责任、任务或个体的任务，办公室或者组织。如在 1947 年的国家安全
法案中的定义，修订“功能”包括功能权力和责任（5 United State Code 171n(a)）.”来源：Joint Publication 1-02, Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 15 January 2012.   
5 在北极地区的美国国家战略，2013 年 5 月 
6 多年冰层是海冰，它至少在一个融化的季节维持下来（也就是一个夏天）。来源：Sechrist, F.S.; Fett, R.W.; Perryman, D.C., 
“Forecasters Handbook for the Arctic,” Naval Environmental Prediction Research Facility Technical Report TR 89-1. 2 October 
1989. Web. 17 Oct 2013. 
<http://www.nrlmry.navy.mil/forecaster_handbooks/Arctic/Forecasters%20Handbook%20for%20the%20Arctic.htm>   
7 Gibbs, W. “Russia and Norway Reach Accords on Barents Sea.” New York Times. 27 April, 2010. Web. 26 Sept 2013. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/europe/28norway.html?_r=0>   
8 Kraska, J. “From Pariah to Partner: Russian-American Security Cooperation in the Arctic Ocean,” ILSA Journal of International 
& Comparative Law 16, no. 2 (2009), Web 3 Oct. 2013. <http://ssrn.com /abstract=1648907.>   
9 Conley, H. “Arctic Economics in the 21st Century: The Benefits and Costs of Cold.” Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, July 2013.   
10 Budzik, P. “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Office of Integrated Analysis and 
Forecasting Oil and Gas Division. October 2009.Web. 20 Aug. 2013. 
<http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/pdf/arctic_oil.pdf>   
11 同上 
12 Intelligence Community Assessment. “Military Implications of the Diminished Sea Ice in the Arctic Through 2030.” ICA 
2012-50. 11 July 2012.   
13 U.S. Navy. “Navy Arctic Mission Analysis.” June 2011.   
14 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. pg. 30 Web. 19 April, 2013. 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm>   
15 同上 
16 National Snow and Ice Data Center. “Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum.” NSIDC press release. 19 Sept. 
2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2013. <http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-minimum/>   
17 无冰期定义为，大于 10%的海冰浓度，无冰的土地来源（如冰山），在没有破冰船护航的情况下舰船在开放的水域航行。
World Meteorological Organization Pub No. 259 Sea Ice Nomenclature.   
18 “平季”定义为小于 40%的冰覆盖。气候变化工作组（TFCC）公约 
19 U.S. Geological Survey. “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic 
Circle.” USGS Fact Sheet 2008 and USGS Web. 15 Aug. 2013. 
<http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home>   
20 Budzik, “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential.”   
21 Carmel, S. M. “The Cold Hard Realities of Arctic Shipping.” Proceedings of the Naval Institute, Vol. 139/7/1,325. July 2013. 
Web. 20 Aug. 2013. <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-07/cold-hard-realities-arctic-shipping>   
22 Winter, A. “U.S. Bans Commercial Fishing in Warming Arctic.” Scientific American, 21 Aug. 2009. Web. 9 Sept 2009. 
<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=ban-commercial-fishing-arctic-global-warming>   
23 Office of Naval Intelligence. “Geostrategic Assessments for the Arctic: Civil Maritime Activity, National Interests, and Future 
Trends.” Briefing, July 2013.   
24 Perry, C. M. and B. Andersen. “New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region.” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Feb. 2012. 
Web. 8 Oct. 2013. <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf>   
25 Budzik, “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential.”   
26 海军情报办公室“地缘政治评估” 
27 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. “New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region.” Feb 2012. Web. 20 Sept. 2013 
<http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf>   
28 “Illulissat Declaration.” Arctic Report. Web. 18 Nov. 2013.  
<http://www.arctic-report.net/?post_type=products&p=859&lang=en>   
29 U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet. “Secretary Clinton Signs the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement with Other Arctic 
Nations.” 12 May, 2011. Web. 9 Sept. 2013. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163285.htm>   
30 U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet. “Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic” 15 May, 2013. Web. 9 Sept. 2013. < http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209406.htm>   
31 海军情报办公室“地缘政治评估” 
32 北极鹰是一个两年一次的演习，在 2004 年联合俄罗斯-美国-挪威海军共同开始的。上一次是 2012 年 8 月在巴伦支海举
行。 
33 加拿大行动是在加拿大北部最大规模的加拿大军事力量的年度演习。通常在 8 月举行，有多国参与。 
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人类共有的地球馈赠。从 18 世纪开始，一些国家的探险家们一次次地向南极发起冲击。20 世纪中叶起，
为了不断揭开南极神秘的面纱，许多国家的科学家陆续有组织地挺进南极开展科学考察。不论是探险还是
考察，人们对南极的涉足始终带有明显的国家特征。美国、前苏联、英国、法国、日本、澳大利亚、南非、






1984 年 11 月 20 日，贯彻中央关于“要为人类和平利用南极作出贡献”的决策精神，中国首次南极
考察队奔赴南极，开启了中国独立自主开展南极考察的光辉历程。经历了筚路蓝缕的艰辛创业，时至今日，
中国极地事业已经取得了不菲的成就：中国开展了 30 次南极科学考察和 5 次北极科学考察；已建立起以
“雪龙”船，南极长城站、中山站、昆仑站、泰山站，北极黄河站和极地考察国内基地为主体的南北极考
察战略格局和基础平台；在南极建立及合作建立了 2 个南极特别保护区和 1 个南极特别管理区；成为四大
国际极地组织（ATCM--南极条约协商国组织、SCAR--国际南极研究科学委员会、COMNAP—国家南极局局长
理事会，IASC—国际北极研究科学委员会）的正式成员国。大体而言，中国极地考察事业可分为四个阶段：
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1985年10月，成为《南极条约》协商国(ATCPs) 正式成员国；  
1986年06月，成为南极研究科学委员会(SCAR) 正式成员国；  
1990年08月，成为国家南极局局长理事会(COMNAP)成员国。  
1994年08月，中国政府批准《南极条约环境保护议定书》  
















    1、在《南极条约》等国际条约框架下，资助我国科学家参加其他国家和国际组织牵头的IPY 核
心计划； 
    2、接受外国科学家参与IPY中国行动计划并提供必要的保障条件； 
    3、与有关国家联合开展冰穹A和甘伯采夫冰下山脉探测； 
    4、举办和参加相关国际会议，开展极地研究和考察保障协调与交流； 
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1 这一年，中国南极考察队成功到达 Dome A 地区；也是这一年，中国极地研究中心主任张占海当选为 SCAR 的副主席（为
期两年）。Anne-Marie Brady, 在其“China's Rise in Antarctica?”认为第四阶段是中国谋求在南极事务上更多的发言权




2  “The Hidden Process of China‟s Accession to the Antarctic Treaty,” Contemporary China History Studies, no. 4 (2004), pp. 
30–49. 
3  Dian Olson Belanger, Deep Freeze: The United States, the International Geophysical Year, and the Origins of Antarctica’s Age 
of Science (Boulder, Colo.: University Press of Colorado, 2006), pp. 38,373. Belanger‟s information on the U.S.‟s attitude toward 
China and Antarctica in the 1950s is based on U.S. State Department files from the period. 
4  Wei-chin Lee, “China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet So Near,” Asian Survey 30:6 (June 1990), p. 580. 
5  “中国极地考察大事记”（一九七九年）。 
6  “中国极地考察大事记”（一九八一年）。 
7  “中国极地考察大事记”（一九八四年） 
8  “中国极地考察大事记”（一九八四年） 
9  中国极地研究中心项目办公室，《中国极地考察国内基地建设项目》，《海洋开发与管理》，2004 年第 5 期 
10  陈永祥：《中国极地考察独具特色的后勤保障体系》，《海洋开发与管理》，2004 年第 5 期 
11  颜其德：《中国南极科学考察综述》，.2004.11 
12  陈立奇：《南极考察回顾及今后极地研究展望》，《地球科学进展》，1997 年 4 月。 
13  张侠，朱建钢等：《中国极地科学考察数据管理与共享》，《海洋开发与管理》，2004 年第 5 期。 
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杨 浩   
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了北极地区的人口概况。环北极国家北极地区面积总和约为 1650 万平方公里，人口总和约为 1044 万人口
密度为 0.63 人/平方公里（据 2006 年数据统计）24。在北极地区现有人口中，原住民约 200 多万人，主要































关注原住民的权利，最引人瞩目的便是原住民的自治问题。20 世纪 70 年代以来，加拿大因纽特人开
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上世纪 90 年代初，中国就开始了北极科学考察的前期准备工作。2006 年，中国向北极理事会提出申请，
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38 白春江 等.北极航线探讨[J].航海技术，2009，（5） 
39 郑中义.北极航运的现状与面临的挑战.中国远洋服务，2013，（10） 
40 郭培清 等.北极航道的国际问题研究[M].北京：海洋出版社，2009 






46 邵乐韵.“北极俱乐部”，中国来了[N].环球. http://www.dooland.com/iptv/article.php?id=275943 
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北极理事会新成立了北极海洋旅游项目（Arctic Marine Tourism Project，AMTP），该项目由美国、
加拿大共同领导，保护北极海洋环境工作组（Protection of the Arctic Marine Envrionment，PAME）
负责组织。其目的是推动环北极旅游的可持续发展，促进北极地区居民社会文化、环境和经济利益最大化。
AMTP 第一次会议于 2014年 3月 18-19 日在加拿大渥太华举行，计划 2014 年秋天召开第二次会议。 
 
丹麦哥本哈根大学教授访问本院 
























2014 年 第 2 期（总 7 期） 
72 
 
学术委员会主任  夏立平                                    
学术委员会（按姓氏笔画为序） 
王传兴  陇丹红  陇玉刚  苏  平  陆俊元  宋黎磊   
杨  剑  张  侠  郭培清  夏立平  徐世杰  潘  敏 
  
主编  王传兴 



























王传兴教授的发言题目为" The Arctic Shipping Route Political Economy and China"，苏平老师的发
言题目为“北极开发的经济风险”。 
 













2014年 5 月 30日，王传兴教授与挪威南森研究所正式签署译书协议。根据协议，南森研究所为 Arctic 
Politics, the Law of the Sea and Russian Identity (《北极政治、海洋法和俄罗斯的身份》)和 Making 
Fishery Agreements Work: Post-Agreement Bargaining in the Barents Sea(《促使渔业协定发挥作用：
协定签署后在巴伦支海的讨价还价》)两书译成中文并出版提供资助。 
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2014 年 5 月，本中心副主任潘敏副教授参与由中国科协发起“未来地球”（Future Earth) 计划“极
地与可持续发展”工作小组，研究气候变化对北极原住民生活、文化的影响。 
 
苏平博士于 2014 年 6月 1 日对阿库雷里大学渔业专家进行调研。 
 
2014 年 6月 1 日-15 日，本中心副主任潘敏副教授在加拿大努纳武特省会伊魁特（Iqaluit）调研北
极原住民因纽特人的生活状况及其气候变暖对其影响、原住民对北极资源开采所持的态度等。 
 





从而增进合作。2014 年 6月 6 日，http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140606/40622912_0.shtml 
 
2014 年 6月 2 日至 5 日，苏平博士参加冰岛-北极合作会议并做了“北极开发的不确定性及其对中国
北极战略的影响”的主题发言。 
 
2014 年 6月 5 日，苏平博士参加了中冰经济论坛。 
 
2014 年 6月 6 日，苏平博士对北极理事会动植物保护工作组秘书处进行调研。 
 
2014 年 6月 7 日，苏平博士对冰岛大学进行调研。 
 
丹麦 ALborg 大学学者来我院演讲 






2014 年 6 月，本中心主任夏立平教授课题“中国参与北极地区开发的理论与方略研究”获得国家社
科基金一般项目。 
 








2014 年 第 2 期（总 7 期） 
74 
 
学术委员会主任  夏立平                                    
学术委员会（按姓氏笔画为序） 
王传兴  陇丹红  陇玉刚  苏  平  陆俊元  宋黎磊   
杨  剑  张  侠  郭培清  夏立平  徐世杰  潘  敏 
  
主编  王传兴 











征 稿 通 知 
《极地国际研究通讯》刊载有关极地政治、极地
治理和极地政策方面的研究成果。欢迎各位专家
学 者 投 稿 。 来 稿 字 数 不 限 。 来 稿 请 投 寄
bispr2012@163.com,并请注明作者单位和联系方
式。 
 
